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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18976

FRED VELARDE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEllENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Fred Velarde, appeals his conviction for
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, ntah Code Ann.
El 76-6-412( 1) (a),

( 1953) as amended, in the Second Judicial

District Court in and for Morgan County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of Theft in a jury trial
held November 16, 1982 in the Second Judicial District Court
of Morgan County, the Honorable J. Duffey Palmer, Judge,
presiding.

Appellant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen

years in the Utah State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction below.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early morning hours of October 1, lg82, John
Pentz, a resident of Morgan, Utah, arrived

in Salt Lake City

with his brother (R.94-9S).

Petz's brother went

into the

Western Club on Redwood Road

in Salt Lake City, hut Pentz

wac

refused admission because he did not have proper
identification (R.95, 103).
Pentz walked down the street to the 7-11 store.
Pentz testified that while he was there appellant_ drove into
the parking lot of the store in a yellow pickup truck
(R. 95-96, 105-106).

Although appellant appeared to be drunk,

Pentz asked appellant whether he would give him a ride to the
freeway so that Pentz could hitchhike home because Pentz
believed his brother planned to stay the night in Salt Lake
City (R.96, 106-107).
going.

Appellant asked Pentz where he was

Pentz replied, "Morgan."

Appellant then, according to

Pentz' s testimony, offered to drive Pentz to Morgan because
appellant had nothing else to do (R.96, 107).
Pentz futher related at trial that as they drove
appellant told him he had been "partying" and that he had hit
a telephone pole or two (R.98).

After appellant exited the

freeway at the Morgan turnoff, appellant began to weave back
and forth across the road.

Approximately five miles outside

of Morgan, appellant passed out and slumped over on the seat.
Pentz testified that he grabbed the steering wheel and pulled
the truck over to stop at the side of the road.
-2-

Pentz then

got out of the pickup truck, walked around to the driver's
side, slid appellant over to the passenger side of the cab,
and drove the truck toward Morgan (R.98, 109-110, 114-115).
As Pentz drove to Morgan, appellant opened his coat,
and Pentz saw that appellant was bloody.

Appellant told Pentz

that he had been stabbed, then added, "I hope you know you're
drivin' a hot truck" (R.99, 110).

Pentz drove the truck into

Morgan and parked in front of the Country Cafe on Main Street.
Pentz then telephoned the Sheriff's Office from a telephone
booth in front of the cafe (R.99-100, 112).
Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Vincent Nelson
responded to the call at approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 1,
1982 (R.100, 112, 116-117).

Pentz related to Deputy Nelson

what had happened (R.102, 117).

Deputy Nelson walked over to

the pickup truck and observed appellant lying on the seat of
the cab, his head toward the driver's side (R.117).

Deputy

Nelson noted the license number of the pickup truck and
initiated a stolen vehicle check through dispatch.

Deputy

Nelson then rapped on the window of the pickup truck for two
minutes in an effort to arouse appellant.
eventually responded (R.118, 125).

Appellant

As appellant got out of

the truck he recognized that Deputy Nelson was a law
enforcement officer, and appellant immediately went into a
search position against the side of the truck without any
prompting by Deputy Nelson (R.118-119).
After Deputy Nelson frisked appellant, Deputy Nelson

-3-

took him to the patrol car.

Dispatch informen Deputy Nelson

that the pickup truck had been stolen from the Port lanCI
Company in Salt Lake C:ity (R.119).

CPrie> 1,,

Deputy Nelson then pl.11"

appellant under arrest and arlvised him of his

riciht

(R.120).

Deputy Nelson asked appellant whether he owned he

vehicle.

Appellant said, "No."

(R.21.).

asked appellant who did own it.
know.

1

1;

The officer next

Appellant replied he rlirl not

Deputy Nelson then asked appellant how he had come to

Morgan.

Appellant told him that he had come in the truck, but

appellant was apparently unaware that he was in Morgan
(R.121).

Deputy Nelson testified that he asked appellant

other questions, but appellant was unable to provirle much
information.

Nelson recalled at trial that appellant appeared

to be intoxicated (R.121).
Appellant was charged with Theft and tried by jury
on November 16, 19R2 in the Second Judicial District Court of
Morgan County,

the Honorable ,1. Duffy Palmer presiding.

At

trial appellant contended that he had been picked up while
hitchhiking from Redwood Road to his residence at 100 South
200 East in Salt Lake City (R.135-137).

According to

appellant, the driver, presumably State's witness Pentz,
passed appellant's residence and drove toward Morgan on
Interstate 15.

Appellant claims he passed out on the way to

Morgan (R.137).
On cross-examination the prosecutor, over
appellant's objections, asked appellant whether he had told

-4-

his version of the facts to Deputy Nelson at the time of his
arrest or to any other person before trial.
(R.92, 94, 96; See Appendix A).

Appellant had not

The prosecutor also mentioned

in his closing argument appellant's failure to relate his
exculpatory story before trial

(R. 104-105, 109-110; See

Appenclix A).
Appellant was found guilty of Theft and sentenced to

serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTOR'S REFERENCES TO APPELLANT'S
FAILURE TO RELATE HIS EXCULPATORY STORY
BEFORE TRIAL WERE PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE
APPELLANT WAS NOT SILENT.
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's references
to appellant's failure to relate his exculpatory story before
trial violated his right to a fair trial.

The United States

Supreme Court in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), cited by
appellant, said, "We hold that the use for impeachment
purposes of petitioners• silence, at the time of arrest and
after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.• Id. at 619.

This Court

followed Doyle in State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 (1981).
However, Doyle is not applicable where, as here, the
defendant has not remained silent.

In United States v. Agee,

597 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1979), the court said:

-5-

The Supreme Court has described [the right
to silence] as "the right to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will."
The
rationale which the Supreme Court adopted
for its decision in Doyle was that it is
fundamentally unfair--rorthe prosecution
to impose a penalty at trial on a
defendant who has exercised that right by
choosing to remain silent.
The very
statement of that rationale demonstrates
that Doyle can have no application to a
case TnWFlich the defendant did not remain
silent.
Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted).

The Supreme Court of Maine in

State v. Kane, 432 A.2d 442 (Me. 1981), stated:

"Once a

defendant decides to speak, her failure to speak in
exculpation cannot be explained away as a response to Miranda
warnings."

Id. at 444.

The Maine supreme Court went on to

quote Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir.
1967):
A defendant cannot have it both ways.
If
he talks, what he says or omits is to be
judged on its merits or demerits, and not
on some artif ical standard that only the
part that helps him can be later referred
to.
This was not a case where the
government commented upon .
. a prior
exercise of rights.
The government asked
the jury to measure what the defendant
said when he had no rights because he had
voluntarily waived them.
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that Doyle
is inapplicable in such situations.
447 U.S. 404 (1980), the Court said:

In
"But Doyle does not

apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior

-fi-

inconsistent statments.

Such questioning makes no unfair use

of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain
silent."

Id. at 40R.
In the instant case appellant was not silent after

being advised of his Miranda rights.

Deputy Nelson asked

appellant several questions concerning his presense in the
stolen pickup truck.
(R.120-121).

Appellant voluntarily responded to each
Thus, Doyle is

The prosecutor impeached

trial story by

use of appellant's prior inconsistent statements.

The

prosecutor contrasted Deputy Nelson's testimony that appellant
stated at the time of his arrest that he could not remember
anything relating to his presence in the stolen pickup truck
with the fact that six weeks later at trial appellant claimed
to remember exculpatory facts explaining his presence in the
truck (R. 92-93, 103-104, 110; See Appendix A).
Furthermore, where a defendant claims, as here, to
be a victim and not the perpetrator of the criminal conduct
charged, it is permissible for the prosecutor to attempt to
show that the defendant's actions and responses were not the
usual actions and responses of a victim.
223 Kan. 261, 574 P.2d 210 (1977).

State v. Taylor

Thus, the prosecutor

properly commented on appellant's taking the search position
against the truck immediatley upon recognizing that Deputy
Nelson was a law enforcemtent officer and on apellant's
,'
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failure to protest his innocence in his voluntary responses h
Deputy Nelson's questions.

CONCLUSION
The prosecutor did not impermissibly comment on
appellant's exercise of his right to silence because appellant
was in fact not silent.

The prosecutor merely impeached

appellant's exculpatory trial story by use of appellant's
prior inconsistent statements and by noting the inconsistency
between appellant's trial story and his actions and responses
at the time of his arrest.

Therefore, appellant was not.

denied a fair trial, and the conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SURMITTED this
1983.

day of October,

"'ii:i?;

DAVID L. WILKINSON

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy
of the foregoing Rrief of Respondent, postage prepaid, to
Bernard L. Allen, Attorney for Appellant, 2568 Washington
Blvd., Ogden, Utah, 84401, this
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of October, 1983.

APPENDIX A
This appendix contains the challenged portion of the
prosecutor's cross-examination of appellant as well as the
comrlete closing
prosecutor.

and rebuttal argument of the

Segments have been highlighted to facilitate

reading ease.
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Sl

A.

v:ell let me ei:olain 'Alhat har·De:.ed.
CCU?T:

TPF

You have to just

Will

-- to oet jy the car
in a lot of

You are

talking.

You answer the

have this rr.an :iere.

just

That's the reason that you

Just ans1•er and then he

1 a-sk Joi; •

questions so rou can qet it in.
lO

I

recall that.

11
12

I

!>.•

All risht.
ask vou ".?ues-f:ions,

Tt:-=-

15

16

the ccurt, you don't control·

the co;;rt.

<;1uestions.
A.

17

Yes, sir.
(5y

vr.

vou

ao into a

U search position a9ainst the vehicle.
19

A.

20

Q.

ll

22
23

24
lb

Yes, I
are

air..
yOl'.

te2.lin0

that you di6 that because

Of!icer '.:elson told you to or because he
A.

Because he told rne that I
O'<ay, so ';here is
'.''o1;

tell you to?
under arrest.

else
yoL·r

remenber.

is th3t Mr. Pent:"

stole this vehicle, isn't it?

.

Office: 867·2211

HAL R. REES
Registered Professional Reporter

Res: 829·3976

A.

I don't know if he did or not.

2

0.

Well come on, Mr. Velarde, your position very cleJrl

3

is that Pentz should

4

vehicle, right?

5

6
7
8

A.

00

here exolaining hm·1 'le -,c,•c thi:lt

don't know if he, if he stole it or not.

I

Don't

even know the car was stollen.

0.

Mr. Velarde, on that evening, why dirin't Y?U

Officer-Nelson your si1e of the story?
MR. ALLEN:

9

10

I will object.

,

I will object.

The

has a right not to talk to an officer.

11

COURT:

12

\1hy he diC..'"1' t

13

A.

is overruled, he can answer

if he didn't want to.

'cause he read

rny Miranda rights anrl I felt that

14

I didn't have to answer him any questions that would out my,

15

that uould be used against me in a court of law.

16

Q.

Mr. Velarde, haven't you repeatedly tol1 Mr. Nelson

17

after the Miranda Warning, I think, that you coulan't remember

18

anything?

19
20

Well that's just like not talkin' to him.

0.

Now but, Mr. Velarde, have you rereatedly told

21

Mr. Nelson upon direct questioning from him

22

you didn't want to talk because of your legal rights, but

23

simoly you couldn't remember anything?

24
25

A.

you not, that

I remember when he come and pounded on the window,

well I didn't remember

Office: 867·2211

when he come ooundin' on the windo1-1,

HAL R. REES
Regis1ered Professional Reporter

r
I

1

Res. 829·3976

93

when I woke up, I remember him standin' out there and tellin'
me to come out of the car.

And Prior tothat, I remember hitch-

hikin' from that bar, Farrel's?
Did you or

you now at the time Officer Nelson

u?on questioning from him, tell him 'Why you were in the truck,
where the truck came from?
A.

No, I did not.
That you couldn't remember anything?

A.

No, I did not.

lO

So to that extent you are qoing to say that Officer

ll

testimony is incorrect and your testimony is correct?
MR. ALLEN:

I will object, Your Honor.

I don't recal

the testimony of Officer Nelson being what the prosecution is
14

saying.

15

MR. PATTERSON:

18

THE COURT:

It's in the record, Your Honor.

I don't recall it being that way either,

but it's easy to varify.

18

MR. ALLEN:

I object that it's

19

THE COURT:

Well the objection is sustained on the

20

form of the questions.

21
22

Mr. Velarde, did you, or did Officer
where you got the truck?
A.

No, he never.
Did he ask you why you were in the truck?

25

A.

I don't think he asked me any of that.

Office: 867-2211

HAL A. REES

Registered Professional Reporter

Res: 829-3976

ask you

Q.

1
2

asked you about where the truck cane from, or how y0u

!lldy

3

got it, or what you had been doino with it, you c1nn

rer.lc1.1Lc

4

him asking you any questio;-is of that nature?

5

6

A.

'

I
I
I
I
I
I

It's

1

t

!1

l

t

I don't know, it kind of lays in ny hea::.

I was pretty high that night in, ahh, I don't know.
Q.

7

I

And to any questions that Officer 11clson riay havP

And is it your- oosition, Mr. Velar.-,e, that, do I

8

understand your testimony correctly, is that you chose not

9

to tell Mr. Nelson anything because you don't trust oolice offi C'.;;10

10

A.

That's correct.

ll

11

Q.

So you have elected to qo forward with this entire

12

12

criminal prosecution, be arrested for vehicle theft, and wait

13

until today for the first time to give your version of what

14

ha.ppened?

15

16

MR. ALLEN:

Anyone arrested under t!-:e law has the right not to soeak.

17

18

Your Honor, I will object to the question

THE COURT:
I

I

can't even hear you.

can't hear you, Mr. Allen.

I

Ca!1

1

t year you!

(Note: Mr. Allen was not standing.

19

MR. ALLEN:

Excuse me.

20

THE COURT:

I can't hear you.

21

Tl:'E BAILIFF:

22

MR. ALLEN:

Stand UD.
I apologize, Your Honor.

The defendant

23

has the right at the time he is arrested not to say anythina.

24

He has the right not to have that used against hiri.

25

has repeatedly tried to infer some kind of negative inference

Office: 867-2211

HAL R REES
Registered Professional Reporter

Res 829-3976

Now counse

I

13
14

95

from that.

Now it's possible that he had this experience

and has been told by attorneys not to speak and I think he
has a right not to speak and not to use that against him.
THE COURT:

That's correct, but he asked if this

the first time he has ever told his story.
a proper question.

was

I think that's

That's the substance of his question.

MR. PATTERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I think that's a proper question.

Q.

(By Mr. Patterson:)

Answer the que_stion, Mr. Velarde.

A.

What are you referring to?

O.

Okay.

You ctose, you answered certain ouestions from

Officer Nelson, did you not?
k

No, I never.

Q.

You never answered any questions that Mr. Nelson

asked you?
No, I didn't.

It states in the police report that

there was, I answered no questions.
I'm not asking you about the police report, Mr.

.8

9

I'm simply asking you, di-:1 you ans1-1er any questions Officer Nelson

O

asked you?

!l

2

5

MR. ALLEN:

I believe he's answered that question,

Your Honor.
l>.

No, I said no.

I don't know how Many times I have

got to say no.
THE COURT:

Office: 867·2211

Mr. Velarde, you just answer the question

HAL R. REES
Registered Professional Reporter .Res: 829·3976

••

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1

A.

No, no.

2

Q.

Mr. Velarde, this is the first time that you

3

elected to state your version of what

4

County and in Morgan County, is that true?

5

e

A.

10

Q.

six weeks you have chosen to remain silent and

to utilize just today to say

--

A.

I have talked to my attor!'ley.

13

Q.

what has occurred.

14

I have no further questions.

15

THE COURT:

16

19

j

13 BY
14

I

Mr. Allen.

15 By

16 Ani
17 I

BY MR. .Z\L!-EN:
Mr. Velarde, you have come in contact with the

police before, is that correct?

18 fo
19

20 so

A.

Yes, I have.

21

Q.

And have you had opportunity to be reoresented by

counsel before: is that correct?

2l th

22 tt

23 wi

23

A.

Yes, I have.

24

Q.

You recognize that you have a riqht not to tell the

25

11 to
I

REDIRECT EXA!1PJ.Z\TI01\J

Q.

10

112

20

22

to

sev

What do you mean by that?

12

18

I r

This is

occurred in excess of six weeks ago?
A.

17

the

And that, and notwithstanding that this offense

9

11

tha

in Salt

Well yea, it's the first time I have said anythinq

about the case.

7
8

tO
hii\·r,

24 tt

25

police anything?

Office: 867·2211

HAL R. REES
Registered Professional Reporter

Res 829·3976
rv. flJ---

O

102

to be argued to you and the Court has some other instructions
to read.

I'm not going to thrill you with me reading those

that I have already read, but we will send them with you in
the jury room so you have them to read and go over.
Each of the parties have rested their cases and after
I read the instructions, they each have an opportunity to speak
to you concerning their case.
Starting with instruction number eight, I
seven.

10

(Whereupon the Judge read the remaining jury instructi ns

11 to the jury after which the following proceedings were had:)
CLOSING ARGUMENTS

i 12

I

/13 BY MR. P.".TTERSON:
14

MR. PATTERSON:

This is the time for closing argument

15 By law, both of the parties are allowed to do so at this time.
16 And after we have been given it, I have a chance to go again.
17 I am going to speak for ten minutes and I am going to speak
18 for five minutes after Mr. Allen takes his time.

19

We have two witnesses to testify because, unfortunate

20 so, because nobody saw the actual taY.ing.
21 the truck was an hour later.

n

the theft site.

We did know where

It was some 17 blocks removed fro.

How did it get there?

Well we have two

23 witnesses and two witnesses only and that's Mr. Pentz and
that's Mr. Velarde.

You are going to have to believe in whole

or reject in whole either what Mr. Pentz has said or what

Office: 867·2211

HAL R. REES
Registered Professional Reporter

Res: 829-3976

pa..s.e...

JS-1

I.

People like you and me tend lo take differin.

l

Mr. Velarde said.

2

view of the same and tend to reconcile.

3

talk to us in good faith.

4

honestly.

5

Either Mr. Pentz or Mr. Velarde has intentionally lied under

6

oath.

7

the truth.

8

of them-has chosen to lie about it.

9

here, it's an either-or.

assun•c· l'1at pcopl"

Vle

\ve assume that peo!-'le Lllk lo ue;

But, Ladies and Gentlemen, you can't clo U1.Jt here.

One of these gentlemen has intentionally misrepresented
One of them does know what indeed did happen.
So

Now is Mr. Velarde truthful?

10

One

is no 9rey area

I ask you to consider

11

these factors.

12

position upon being woken up by Officer Nelson?

13

Nelson was,

14

professional police officer.

15

saw to grind.

16

the line.

He has very accurately represented to you what

17

happened.

I'm not going to go through the testimonv except

18

to say that

19

to him some ten minutes after he arrived.

20

Miranda Warnings were read, Officer Nelson said, "Who's truck

21

is this?"

22

I'm not going to talk to you, I don't like police officers,

23

he said, "Why are you in the truck?"

24

remember."

25

Why did he immediately go into the search

saw he was intoxicated.

tlov: Officer

Officer Nelson is a

Officer Nelson doesn't have a

He's not on the line, his reputation is not on

Nelson read Mr. Velarde the
And after the

Mr. Velarde said, "I don't know."

It wasn't

Warning

He didn't say

"I don't know, I can't

''I can't remember."

"I can't remem'::lcr

Now, I can't remember is a world apart from what

Office: 867-2211

HAL R. REES
Registered Professional Reporter

Res 829-3976

104

Velarde now says.
2

remember then?
truck?

Why does Mr. Velarde remember now but he didn't

Why the immediate search position against the

I know Mr. Velarde doesn't like police officers, let's

assume he doesn't.

Why does Mr. Velards have to assume that

Mr. Nelson knows anything?
6

In fact

Velarde says he is

innocent.
Now why does an innocent man go into a search against

8

a truck?

9

Office?

In that basis, why did Mr. Pentz call the Sheriff's
If Mr. Velarde's statement is true, Mr. Pentz had

10 everything to lose because Mr. Velarde was drunk.

11

On what

basis could Mr. Pentz fairly think that Mr. Velarde would ever
recognize him

again?

Why does Mr. Pentz in effect put himself

iU

back into the boiling water by calling the Sheriff's Office,

114

telling him where to go and then unlike Mr. Velarde, relate

I

15

to the officerwhat happened?

16 with success then wasn't he.

Mr. Pentz in effect was messing
Why would he do that?

Why would

17 Mr. Pentz in effect return to the scene to invite an arrest
18 and to invite felony charges being filed.

Mr. Pentz didn't

He was being truthful.

Mr. Pentz, i f he

19

have anything to lose.

20

had in fact stollen that vehicle, should have W3lked away into

21

the night and simply disappeared, never heard from again, never

22 seen again, but he didn't do it.
23

Very inconsistent.

And why does Mr. Velarde wait six weeks?

24

at the accident scene say,

25

not me.

r·•m

innocent? Mr. Pentz had that

You have got the wrong man.
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I

I

1

drive a four-speed.

What's wrong with the outrage?

2

there, according to Mr. Velarde, the guilty man is walkiny

3

away.

4

outrage?

But Mr. Velarde said, I can't remember.

6

got the wrong man.

7

even know where Morgan is.

8

Where is the indignation?

9

Thank you.

10

THE COURT:

Hey, you have

Why am I here?

I didn't

!'lhere is the outrag

Mr. Allen.

BY MR. ALLEN:
MR. ALLEN:

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury.

will be my last opportunity to talk to you.

This

As I spoke in the

15 opening statement that I made, what you have to do here is
16 determine if the State has proven their case beyond a reasonabl

17 doubt.

And what could cause a reasonable doubt in that could

18

the fact that the man was supposed, according to the State, to

19

have driven that truck all the way from Salt Lake to Morgan

20

and was too drunk to walk?

21

doubt?

22

place where Mr. Velarde would have no probable reason for

23

wanting to go to, could that create a reasonable doubt?

24

the fact that Mr. Velarde has testified that he has trouble

25

with four-speed transmissions in anywav, could that create a

Could that create a reasonable

Could the fact that the truck wound up in Morgan, a

Office: 867-2211
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13
14

l'lhere is the·

I don't even drive a four-speed.

11

12

h".1vcn:,

Think about it, you know .
There you are, there Mr. Velarde is.

5

M"·
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1

He has stated forthright that he was absolutely drunk.

2

stated forthrightly that he had problems before.

He

He tells us

that he had a felony conviction before that he pled guilty
4

to meaning that at the time when he was charged with tlia t

6

crime, he felt he was guilty and went ahead anct pled guilty.

6

Here he is today, before you, pleading not guilty,

..

7

putting this case before the jury for you to make the determin-

8

ation whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable.doubt

9

that he stole a truck.

10

I think, in reiterating in closing, the reasonable

11 doubts are everywhere in this case.

The fact that Mr.

12 is to drunk to drive is unusual enough, but the fact that he is
13 too drunk to drive and then manages to drive all the way up
14 to Morgan County where he was found in the passenger side of
15 the truck, creates more than a reasonable doubt in my min<l.
16 And my client, Mr. Velarde and I ask you to look at the
17 evidence and determine that there is not sufficient evidence
18 to convict my client of any crime and we ask you to find him
19 not guilty.

20

THE COURT:

21

Mr. Patterson.
REBUTTAJ, ARGUMENT

22 BY MR. PATTERSON:
23

MR.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you siMply take

24 a look at Mr. Pentz and take a look at Mr. Velarde and tell
25 me why a guilty man .would call the police and then give his

. 1-iAL R. REES
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1

witness statement and appear at trial.

I think we are watching

2

either too much TV or we are too fascinated hy complicaterl plotc

3

But human nature is not such that Mr. Pentz woulcl put cvcrytlti11

4

on the line to put himself back into a crime with no expcctatio

4

5

that Mr. Velarde in a sense of outrage, in a sense of absolute

5

6

pure indignation will say hey, wait a minute, let's get this

6

7

story straight.

7

8

He drove me here.

He picked me up in Salt Lake.

I passed out.

10

who's truck it is, I don't know, I can't remember.

11

are you in it?

12

I don't know, I can't remember.

Now, we have a lot of, "what if's".

Ahh, why

We only have

1

14

all.

15

or you believe Mr. Velarde because one of them is lying .

16

This isn't a complex case at
You either believe Mr. PPntz

Mr. Velarde, by his own testimony, understands he is

17

going no further than 6th South or something like Kaysville;

18

that at 6th South when he asked, his response is to pass out.

19

Now he has never seen Mr. Pentz before in his life and he

20

apparently would have to perceive himself in sort of a helpless

21

situation if we review Mr. Velarde's testimony, but he sure is

22

relaxed about it.

23

where he is being taken to or what is in store for him so he

24

just passes out.

25

He has no idea where he is going or why,

I summize that didn't happen.
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1

two stories.

Just simply two stories.

9

He does.

13

It's very simple.

?

8

I didn't ever have that truck.

But instead he said, when nfficer Nelson asked him

9

1
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he was going and he was driving.
Perhaps you, of the jury, and counsel, don't put in
a 24 hour day the way Mr. Velarde, Mr. Pentz do.

we are not

4

here to pass upon the quality of Mr. Pentz, you know, daily life

5

style or of Mr. Velarde and by that I mean we are not here to

6

admire Mr. Pentz or admire Mr. Velarde.

7

to hear a fact pattern and decide who is being truthful.

8

We are simply here

Mr. Velarde has no choice but to say what he did on

9

the witness stand today or he is guilty.

Mr. Pentz had a

10

choice of never to call the Sheriff's Office and just walk

11

away because by that man's testimony, he never saw Pentz before

12 wouldn't have recognized him, and would have certainly never
13

planned on seeing him again.

14

being nervous?

15

And why was Pentz so doing and

Thank you.

16

(Whereupon, the Bailiff was sworn to take the jury to

17

the jury room and watch over them during their deliberations.)

18

THE COURT:

Now the Bailiff will escort you to the

19

jury room where you may commense your deliberations.

20

first choose one of your members as the foreman to act as a

21

presiding officer.

22

have agreed upon.

23

signed and dated, notify the Bailiff that you agree.

The forman should sign whatever verdict you
When you agreed upon the verdict and it's bein

reveal your verdict to the Bailiff.

25

You should

Do not

The foreman will keep the

verdict in his possession or her possession until such time as

Office: 867-2211

HAL R. REES
Registered Professional Reporter

Res: 829-3976

